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ESTABLISHING PROXIMITY-BASED TRUST OF NEARBY DEVICES THROUGH 
AUDIO COMMUNICATION 
ABSTRACT 
A method for establishing proximity-based trust of nearby devices through audio 
communication is disclosed. The method includes a protocol for devices that communicate over 
audio within a predetermined distance from each other to verify proximity. A packet token is 
included at the end of each packet. After each packet ends broadcasting, the sending device 
listens for a response from the receiving device for a window of time corresponding to the time it 
takes for sound to make a round-trip through the predetermined distance. This mechanism could 
be used in mobile application development where applications are required to ensure co-presence 
within a specified distance from another device as a criterion for trust. 
BACKGROUND 
Currently, direct audio communication between nearby mobile devices is possible. 
Typically, the devices exchange some kind of token over audio by sending an ultrasound 
message which helps in establishing co-presence. An audio communication could be intercepted 
from relatively long distances, for example, by using a parabolic microphone. So, an attacker 
could easily obtain co-presence tokens from a distance and trick other devices into thinking the 
attacker’s device is nearby. By broadcasting at a high volume or by using an acoustic mirror, the 
attacker’s device may also communicate with other devices at a distance. For example, this 
technology could be used to easily share a Wi-Fi key with guest devices or to seamlessly connect 
new Internet of Things devices to a user’s home network, but only if both devices are within a 
predetermined distance. An attacker outside the user’s home network can initiate a request and 
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by misrepresenting itself as a trusted entity, steal the Wi-Fi key, thereby gaining unauthorized 
access to the user’s home network. 
In another example, a driver may want to unlock a car with a smartphone application that 
operates via the cellular data network. However, this leaves the car vulnerable to hackers 
anywhere on the Internet. That vulnerability is eliminated by requiring the user to be physically 
near the car. 
As a third example, many residential gas and electric meters can now be read 
electronically. It is conceivable that a criminal can determine when a homeowner is away for an 
extended time by “war driving” through a neighborhood and reading the meters on each house. 
This becomes impossible if the reader must be within several feet of the meter in order to read it.   
To satisfy this requirement, a method that ensures co-presence of devices within a 
specified distance is proposed. The method verifies proximity of the intended device and thereby 
thwarts security attacks and privacy breaches. 
DESCRIPTION 
A method for establishing proximity-based trust of nearby devices through audio 
communication is disclosed. A protocol by which two devices could communicate over audio, 
ensuring that they are within a predetermined distance from each other, is presented.  The 
protocol is implemented when a user wishes a device to initiate communication with another. 
The method is as follows: 
1. The two peer devices (A and B, respectively) take turns to broadcast packets over audio. 
2. After either device sends a packet, it listens for a response from the other device for a 
predetermined window of time. The window corresponds to the time it takes for sound to 
make a round-trip through the maximum allowable distance between A and B. 
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3. Each packet ends with a random packet token, ensuring the receiver must wait for the 
entire packet before it can initiate the response. 
4. Upon receiving any packet, each device returns its token in some form, in addition to any 
data payload it transmits. 
5. When a device receives a packet within the allowed window, it verifies that the previous 
packet token is valid, thereby ensuring proximity of its peer. Packets that begin outside 
the window, or that contain invalid tokens, are discarded as fraudulent. 
An implementation of the method, as shown in FIG. 1, illustrates three devices: two user 
devices, A and B, and an attacker device, E. A predetermined distance D, measured from device 
A is designated as safe distance. Devices A and B are near each other at a distance less than D 
and are trusted to communicate with each other by virtue of their proximity. Device E represents 
a potential attacker’s device, at a distance greater than D from both A and B. E is not trusted to 
communicate with A because it is not close enough. 
 
FIG. 1: Establishing co-presence of devices placed within A’s sphere of trust, i.e.  within 
a trusted distance from A. 
 
It is possible for the attacker E located beyond the predetermined distance D to broadcast 
a packet ahead of time such that it arrives at one of the devices during the listening window. The 
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packet token mechanism described above ensures that such a packet from attacker E would be 
invalid, since the attacker would not be able to predict the value of the packet token ahead of 
time, i.e. before the sound arrives at the attacker’s location. The time window described above is 
such that an attacker exactly at the predetermined distance would not have time to broadcast a 
packet after receiving the packet token, and have that packet arrive at A within the listening 
window.  
Timing for a packet sent from device A and a response from B, as well as how the 
listening window of time physically prevents a valid packet sent by E from reaching A in time, 
are illustrated in FIG. 2. Note that device E could send a valid packet after receiving A’s packet 
token, which is at the end of A’s message. B sends a response packet, which arrives within A’s 
listening window. Device E tries to send a valid packet from exactly distance D, but it arrives at 
A at the end of the listening window or beyond, so A ignores it, as shown in FIG. 2. 
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 FIG. 2: Listening window of time for ensuring co-presence of devices 
 
In the implementation of the method, the packet token is included at the end of each 
packet to ensure that an attacker must wait until the end of the packet arrives before it can craft a 
valid response packet. Each packet is cryptographically combined with the most recently 
received packet token in such a way that an attacker cannot craft a valid response packet without 
first receiving the entire packet token. The purpose is to ensure that every bit of the response 
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depends on every bit of the packet token. A simple implementation of this step might use the 
previous packet token as a seed to generate a random stream of bits and exclusive or (XOR) the 
result with the bits of the packet before transmission. 
  
FIG. 3: Sequence of packet transmissions 
 
FIG. 3: illustrates the following sequence: 
1. A initiates communication and appends a random packet token, TA1.  
2. B receives Packet A1. 
3. B responds with “ABC” and appends a new random packet token, TB1. It uses 
TA1, the token it received from A, to seed a string of random bits, R(TA1), which 
it XORs with its reply. 
4. A receives the packet, computes the same string of random bits, R(TA1), and 
again XORs it with the packet to restore the original data. 
5. A responds with “ZYX” and appends a new random packet token, TA2. It uses 
Packet A1:  [“START”  |  TA1] 
2 
1 
Packet A2: [“ZYX”  |  TA2] ⊕ 
5 
6 
Packet B1: [“ABC”  |  TB1] ⊕ 
3 
4 
A B 
... 
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token TB1, which it received from B, to generate R(TB1), which it XORs with its 
reply. 
6. B receives the packet and XORs it with R(TB1) to restore the original data. 
It is not necessary that each packet contain an entire message, as the packets must arrive 
in order and can accumulate within each device until a complete message has been received. 
Each packet contains a relatively small number of bits, so long messages are split into multiple 
packets. 
Standard mechanisms for error detection and correction may be used. However, a retry 
limit should be enforced to prevent an attacker from simply guessing the packet tokens until it 
succeeds. 
Definitions and equations describing physical properties and limitations associated with 
the method are presented: 
Description  Units Notes 
Predetermined maximum safe distance D m  
Distance between two nearby devices d m d < D 
Bit rate of data transmitted over audio b bits/s  
Speed of sound in air* v m/s Worst case: v = 360 m/s 
Listening window Tw s Tw = 2D/v 
Maximum length of response Tt s 2(D - d)/v 
Maximum packet length B bits B = floor(b × Tt) = floor[2b(D - 
d)/v] 
 
* The speed of sound in air varies with several factors, of which temperature and 
humidity are the most significant. Its approximate range is from 330 m/s at 0° C and 0% 
humidity to 360 m/s at 40° C and 100% humidity. This information can be used to calculate the 
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listening window using the worst-case conditions (highest speed of sound, leading to the shortest 
listening window) for reasonable environmental conditions.  
The maximum packet length depends greatly on how close the two devices are and the 
predetermined maximum safe distance. Examples using arbitrary but practical parameters are 
shown below: 
Given D = 10 m, d = 5 m, b = 1000 bits/s 
Tw = 55.6 m 
Tt = 27.8 ms 
B = 27 bits 
 
Given D = 10 m, d = 2 m, b = 1000 bits/s 
Tw = 55.6 m 
Tt = 44.4 ms 
B = 44 bits 
 
The packet layout could be used from existing protocols for audio transmission, with 
slight modification to include the packet token at the end. If not modifying an existing protocol, 
here is an example of a possible way to lay out a packet.  
 Length Payload Checksum Packet Token  
 
Here, everything but the length is cryptographically combined with the previous packet token 
(except on the first packet). 
Length: Size of the entire packet. 
Payload: Message data. 
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Checksum: Used for error detection or correction. 
Packet Token: Ensures proximity, per discussion above. 
In some variations of the method, the listening window may be modified such that the 
condition is for the beginning of the packet to arrive within the window, and then the devices 
continue to listen until the end of the packet however long it may be, along with some kind 
checksum or hash mechanism to ensure that E is not able to modify the portion of the packet that 
arrives outside of the listening window. 
In another variation, devices are allowed to transmit additional packets during their 
listening window to increase data throughput, in effect sending two consecutive packets and 
expecting two consecutive, corresponding responses.  
In another variation, instead of assuming some worst-case distance between trusted 
devices, they could measure the response time to estimate their actual distance and adjust the 
maximum packet size accordingly. The closer the devices are together, the bigger the packets the 
devices could send within the listening window. 
In another variation, the disclosed method could be extended to an arbitrary number of n 
devices. For example, device A could verify the proximity of the other devices, B, C, etc. in turn. 
Once this is completed, device A will have verified that all other devices are nearby, and all 
devices will also have verified that A is near them. C can then ask A to verify that B is nearby. 
In an example application, devices could exchange public encryption keys using the 
disclosed protocol. After the exchange of public keys, the devices can use those keys as proof of 
initial proximity and continue to communicate over any mechanism using standard Public Key 
Encryption methods for signing and encryption. For example, device A would send a message to 
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B encrypted and signed in a way that ensures A knows only B can decrypt it, and B knows only 
A could have signed it. 
In a second example application, one device, A, can securely share a secret, like a Wi-Fi 
network key, with a nearby device, B. The user would initiate the process, e.g. by pressing a 
button on each device. The devices would establish proof of proximity and exchange public keys 
as described in the example application above. Device A can then transmit the secret encrypted 
and signed such that only B can decrypt it and verify that it was sent by A. The transmission can 
happen over the disclosed method, or another mechanism, e.g. a different audio protocol, 
Bluetooth, Ethernet, Wi-Fi, etc. 
In a third example application, two internet-connected devices, A and B, can establish 
proof of proximity prior to interacting with each other through a cloud service. The devices 
would establish proof of proximity and exchange public keys as described in the example above. 
A cloud service can then broker a high-bandwidth connection between the two devices, where 
each device uses standard mechanisms for securing their connection to the cloud service, e.g. 
HTTPS, SSL, TLS. 
The described protocol does not gather, use or store personal information about users. In 
situations in which specific implementations using the described protocol may collect or use 
personal information about users (e.g., user data, information about a user’s social network, 
user’s location, user’s biometric information, user’s activities and demographic information), 
users are provided with one or more opportunities to control whether the personal information is 
collected, whether the personal information is stored, whether the personal information is used, 
and how the information is collected about the user, stored and used.   
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